

Message Text

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46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 AEC-11

AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11 EUR-25 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-14 NSAE-00 NSC-07

OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01 RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20 SAJ-01

USIE-00 DRC-01 /197 W

----- 123655

O P 071318Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7645

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LIMA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 5099

DISTO

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM AS

SUBJ: CCD - PROBLEMS CONCERNING AUSTRALIAN

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

REF: STATE 170432

1. AUSTRALIAN PERMREP (CORKERY) CALLED ON AMB MARTIN

(US CCD REP) AUG 6 AND PRESENTED LETTER (TEXT SEPTTEL) IN

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WHICH AUSTRALIA FORMALLY APPLIED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN CCD.

AMB MARTIN TOLD CORKERY THAT CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD CIRCULATE THE AUSTRALIAN LETTER TO ALL CCD MEMBERS AS WAS DONE WITH OTHER APPLICATIONS. MARTIN STRESSED TO CORKERY, AS INSTRUCTED REFTTEL, THAT US FEELS THAT EFFORT TO INCLUDE AUSTRALIANS IN PRESENT ENLARGEMENT WOULD NECESSARILY RESULT IN REGIONAL AND OTHER CLAIMS THAT WOULD RAISE MEMBERSHIP TOTAL BEYOND 5 WE CONSIDER DESIRABLE AND THAT WE ARE THEREFORE NOT PREPARED TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIAN APPLICATION AT THIS TIME.

2. CORKERY TOOK A HARD LINE AND STATED THAT WHILE HE WOULD NOT WANT TO SAY, WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD FIND IT "INTOLERABLE" IF IT FAILED TO WIN MEMBERSHIP, HE DID WISH TO EMPHASIZE TO US THAT REJECTION OF AUSTRALIA'S CANDIDACY WOULD BE "VERY DIFFICULT TO BEAR". CORKERY SAID THAT HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED STATES IN RECENT WEEKS HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING. HE CONCEDED THAT PAKISTAN AND ARGENTINA WERE OPPOSED TO AUSTRALIA'S ADMISSION, BUT SAID THAT THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS WERE FAVORABLE AND THAT SUPPORT FROM SWEDEN AND YUGOSLAVIA WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG. WHEN PRESSED ON THIS POINT HOWEVER, CORKERY ADMITTED THAT SUCH NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT WAS OF A GENERAL NATURE AND AMOUNTED TO THE EXPRESSION OF A DESIRE OR WILLINGNESS TO SEE AUSTRALIA BECOME A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, IF SOME GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULA OR SPECIAL CATEGORY COULD BE FOUND. CORKERY STRESSED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BEYOND THE INGENUITY OF CCD MEMBERS, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN, TO DEVISE SUCH A FORMULA.

3. AMB MARTIN POINTED OUT THAT WE DID NOT THINK CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED IN THE COMMITTEE ON BRINGING IN AUSTRALIA AS A NON-ALIGNED MEMBER OR AS A SPECIAL CASE AND THAT, EVEN IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE HERE AT THE CCD, IT MIGHT BE CHALLENGED BY OTHERS OR EXPLOITED AS A PRECEDENT AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE PAKISTANI AMB HAD ALREADY TOLD US THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO TREATING AUSTRALIA AS A SPECIAL CASE BECAUSE IT MIGHT SET A PRECEDENT FOR COUNTRIES LIKE ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA. AMB MARTIN ADDED THAT IT WAS ALSO MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT AUSTRALIA AS A SPECIAL CASE NOT REQUIRING THE ADDITION OF A SOVIET ALLY TO PRESERVE POLITICAL BALANCE. COKERY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET AMB ROSHCHIN AHD REACTED NEGATIVELY WHEN THE AUSTRALIANS

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HAD PRESENTED THEIR APPLICATION TO HIM EARLIER THAT DAY. CORKERY STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT IN HIS VIEW THE ATTITUDE OF THE US WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT AND THAT IT WOULD COUNT HEAVILY WITH THE SOVIETS IF THE US APPROACHED THEM IN SUPPORT OF AUSTRALIA'S CANDIDACY.

4. MARTIN REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INSIST ON THE ADMISSION OF AN ALLY, SUCH AS NORTH KOREA, WHICH

THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT AND THAT IN ADDITION THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE PRESSURE FROM OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, EITHER HERE OR AT THE GA. FOR FURTHER REPRESENTATION FROM THEIR REGIONAL AREAS. THES COULD PRODUCE SOME VERY UNDESIRABLE CANDIDATES, SUCH AS ALGERIA. CORKERY COMMENTED THAT IN THE AUSTRALIAN VIEW IT WAS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PRESS FOR ADMISSION OF ONE OF THEIR OWN ALLIES, AD HE SAID AUSTRALIANS HAD HEARD IT SUGGESTED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT INSTEAD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A RADICAL NON-ALIGNED STATE. AUSTRALIANS IN ANY CASE CHALLENGED THE VALIDITY AND SPPLICABILITY OF THE CCD'S TRADITIONAL MEMBERSHIP FORMULA WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CASE. MARTIN POINTED OUT THAT THE POLITICAL BALANCE WHICH THIS FORMULA MAINTAINED WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CCD AND THAT ATTEMPTS TO SET IT ASIDE WOULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS. CORKERY COMMENTED THAT HE NEVERTHELESS INTENDED TO CONTINUE PRESSING AUSTRALIA'S CANDIDACY AND SEEKING WIDER SUPPORT FROM COMMITTEE MEMBERS.

5. COMMENT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT CORKERY'S STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO BEAR" OR, IN THE WORDS OF HIS LETTER, "UNFORTUNATE" IF AUSTRALIA'S APPLICATION WOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE OF THE CCD'S CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP. THIS SEEMS TO RAISE THE POSSIBILITY THAT AUSTRALIANS MIGHT SEEK IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CHALLENGE A MEMBERSHIP SLATE AGREED ON HERE THAT DID NOT INCLUDE THEM. IT IS, MOREOVER, POSSIBLE THAT IN SUCH AN EFFORT THEY COULD GET THE SUPPORT OF CRITICS OF THE CCD, SUCH AS MEXICO, WHO MIGHT NOT BE AVERSE TO USING THIS PROBLEM AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PUSHING FOR RADICAL REFORMS IN THE COMMITTEE'S ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES. THE CCD WOULD BE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO SUCH PRESSURES AT THE FORTHCOMING GA IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS IN ITS WORK.

6. IN ORDER TO ASSESS THIS POSSIBLE DANGER MORE CLEARLY,
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HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT AUSTRALIANS SHOULD ALSO BE CONTACTED IN WASHINGTON AND CANBERRA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE THINK THIS PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE SINCE THERE WAS AN EARLIER INDICATION THAT CORKERY AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY WERE NOT PRECISELY ON THE SAME WAVE-LENGTH (CANBERRA 4836). IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT CORKERY IS ACTING ON HIS OWN IN PRESSING THE AUSTRALIAN CANDIDACY SO ZEALOUSLY. IKF DEPT AGREES THAT SUCH AN APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT AUSTRALIANS BE TOLD IN WASHINGTON AND/OR CANBERRA THAT US IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPASSE THAT IS DEVELOPING OVER THE AUSTRALIAN CANDIDACY AND BY THE IMPLICATIONS THAT THIS MAY HAVE SHOULD AUSTRALIA DECIDE TO PRESS ISSUE AT THE GA. WE THINK IT MIGHT ALSO BE POINTED OUT TO THE AUSTRALIANS THAT THEIR APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE COULD JEOPARDIZE THE ENTIRE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS AND HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AS FAR AS THE COMMITTEE'S

STRUCTURE IS CONCERNED.

7. IF IT APPEARS FROM SUCH CONTACTS THAT CORKERY HAS IN FACT BEEN TOO ZEALOUS, WE WOULD FEEL THAT WE SHOULD THEN SEEK TO COMPLETE ACTION ON THE ENLARGEMENT HERE AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED (BY DECIDING TO INVITE THE FRG, GDR, 84-,, PERU, AND ZAIRE). IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, FURTHER CONTACTS REVEAL THAT AUSTRALIANS ARE SERIOUSLY INTENT ON PUSHING THEIR CANDIDACY AND MAY BE PREPARED TO RAISE THIS IN THE GA, WE THINK A RE-EXAMINATION OF OUR APPROACH TO THE ENLARGMENT ISSUE WOULD BE NEEDED. IN PARTICULAR, WE THINK CONSIDERATION SHOULD THEN BE GIVEN TO APPROACHING THE SOVIETS FORMALLY HERE AND EXPLAINING THAT IN VIEW OF THE REPRESENTATIONS THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE MADE TO US AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM SOME OF THE NON-ALIGNED, WE FEEL OBLIGED TO INQUIRE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AUSTRALIA AS A MEMBER.

8. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT ROSHCIN WOULD EITHER OPPOSE BRINGING AUSTRALIA IN OR INSIST ON THE ADMISSION OF OTHER STATES THAT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. WHILE WE WOULD THEN HAVE TO INDICATE TO THE AUSTRALIANS THAT THE IMPASSE REMAINS, WE WOULD AT LEAST HAVE MADE AN EFFORT ON THEIR BEHALF AND PERHAPS THEREBY REDUCED THE RISK SOMEWHAT OF A AUSTRALIAN BACKLASH DIRECTED AT US OR THE COMMITTEE. IF, HOWEVER, THE AUSTRALIANS PERSISTED AND GAVE FURTHER SIGNS OF BEING PREPARED TO RAISE THIS PROBLEM IN THE GA, WE THINK A VERY HARD LOOK WOULD HAVE

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TO BE TAKEN AT THE RISKS AND PROBLEMS THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL FOR US. WE BELIEVE THAT USG WOULD THEN HAVE TO JUDGE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE FRG AND OTHER ALIES, AS WELL AS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHETHER THE RISKS MIGHT NOT BE SO GREAT AS TO WARRANT DEFERRING THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE CCD UNTIL SOME LATER TIME.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NONALIGNED NATIONS, MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 AUG 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974GENEVA05099
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740215-0873
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740868/aaaacgjk.tel
Line Count: 208
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STATE 170432
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <15 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CCD - PROBLEMS CONCERNING AUSTRALIAN APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
TAGS: PARM, AS
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005